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Abstract 
This paper analyses the crisis that transformed the modern British state in the second half of the twentieth century and 
examines the consequences for social stability. The crisis shifted Britain from a nation that relied upon a social 
democratic state to one where the balance was tipped more in favour of the market. Social democracy required 
governments to deliver welfare and employment to the people, in return for their political support. This close 
relationship was intended to support a homogeneous society in which reciprocity between people and government 
was well understood. It also featured the collective organisation of interests powerfully linked to production. The 
liberal market system that emerged from the crisis of the social democratic state saw a looser relationship between 
state and people, with less direct government responsibility for economic management and greater stress on 
individual choice. Its key actor is the consumer not the producer. This form of state has considerable strength because 
of the way it conforms to global influences in the economy and communications. It also seems to be consistent with a 
more heterogeneous society produced by greater mobility of people. But there are also criticisms that it provides an 
imperfect means of sustaining collective and individual identity, so its value as a source of social stability may be 
qualified.   
The paper begins by comparing two classic analyses of conditions in the middle of the twentieth century, which give 
powerful insights into social transformation:  J.A.Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, and F.A 
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom. It considers their contrasting views as to what causes the transformation of societies, 
as well as a number of related issues: the importance of knowledge; the nature of democracy; and the significance of 
private property. At the conclusion of this analysis it is possible to make some comments on the foundations of social 
order, as differently conceived by both authors. The significance of the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher 
(1979-1990), in this transformation will be analysed. The importance of culture for the cohesion of societies, a factor 
which carries little weight in liberal market societies, will also be assessed. 
Although much of the material in this paper relates to Britain, it is also relevant to more general questions arising 
from globalisation and change. The centrality of the economic process suggests that all societies will continue to be 
subject to almost universal influences driven by modern communications and patterns of consumption. Yet at the 
same time, culture and tradition-which are essentially local and specific in their character-continue to make real and 
important contributions to personal and collective identity.  
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The relationship between the nation state and the global economy is one of the most pressing questions 
in international politics. It has been especially significant at moments of crisis and transformation. While 
the universal forces of the global economy continue to exert a powerful influence, the importance of 
moral orders and traditions specific to particular nations remains intact. This paper examines this problem 
in the light of British experience between 1945 and 2009. It does so  by examining two classic analyses of 
social transformation- by F.A.Hayek and J.A. Schumpeter-and assessing the significance of Margaret 
Thatcher in recent British history. It will deal with not only the shift in emphasis from a social democratic 
to a more market-driven market  but will also consider the recent experience of international conflict and 
the international banking crisis. In the present day, the question is whether these recent events have 
encouraged a greater alignment or harmony between the universal aspects of the global economy on the 
one hand and the values which sustain national identity on the other; or whether the nation state remains 
crucial in the defining of the ethical codes and cultures of particular peoples.  
In the last quarter of the twentieth century a decisive shift in opinion in Britain about the role that state 
should play. Support for active state intervention was replaced by scepticism about its effectiveness, and 
government spending as a share on national income tended to decline. State intervention in economic and 
social life was replaced by a greater emphasis upon the state setting the framework for a society in which 
individual preferences and choices were more powerful. i
The recent crisis in the world economy has led some to claim that this new order will itself prove to be 
transient, because such reliance upon markets and individual choices has produced shocking instability. 
The high costs of risk appear less attractive than the security of state intervention. In the words of a recent 
commentator, ‘the era of laissez-faire economics has ended’, with the consequence that ‘The long 
movement towards market liberalization has stopped, and a new period of state intervention, reregulation, 
and creeping protectionism has begun.’
 This British experience had international 
resonance; the politician most closely linked to it, Margaret Thatcher, prime minister 1979-1990, had an 
impact on the world stage far greater than Britain’s own resources and power merited. The reason for this 
was that the change in Britain harmonised with the explosion of interest in globalisation-the influence 
upon nations especially through communications and the economy of world wide experiences that 
operated outside the state. The most dramatic demonstration of these global influences was the defeat of 
European Communism with which Thatcher was closely associated.  Moreover, it seemed that such 
conditions had established a new, and perhaps permanent, condition for the international order. 
ii
The paper begins by setting out two classic analyses of the relationship between the interventionist 
state and the market economy before examining particular historical circumstances that explain the 
success and impact of Thatcher. It concludes by examining the post-Thatcher period and the emergence of 
what has been called the ‘market state’. 
 Whether events move in this direction remains to be seen. What 
will continue to be a lively issue is the relationship between the global economy and the sources of 
identity-and therefore the codes of behaviour-that guide nations and their subjects. This paper argues that 
the British example from the Thatcher period, while having an international sweep, and forming a model 
for other countries, also demonstrated the particular influences of history and tradition upon behaviour. It 
also suggests that an important dimension of the current crisis is not only the question of regulation, but 
also the importance of moral behaviour in markets; that is, a vital component of behaviour in markets 
comes not from the universal influences of the global economy but from attitudes formed by the traditions 
of particular societies. Resolutions of the current crisis therefore have to be mobilised around national 
experiences as much as involving more obviously global strategies. 
Two of the most interesting accounts of the relationship between social democracy and the market 
economy are Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) and Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1943). Both books have become justly famous and widely referred to in public discussion; they were also 
well known to the leading figures in the Thatcher governments. Hayek’s study provides an incisive 
account of the processes within a market economy and its relationship with personal liberty, while 
Schumpeter offers sharp insights into what he called ‘the civilisation of capitalism’. Both books focused 
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on the dangerous prospect of a greater role for the state in the aftermath of the second world war, ushered 
in through the apparent momentum towards a more socialist society. 
At the heart of Hayek’s account was the desire to restore faith in the spontaneous forces in society. The 
great merit of these forces was that they produced both order and freedom, whereas planning only offered 
order with coercion. Because the economy was driven by a mass of individual decisions, which 
dynamically interacted with each other, it was impossible for anyone authority to plan effectively the 
direction an economy should take. Moreover, because the range of individual preferences could never be 
effectively harmonised into a common purpose or will, order in a planned economy could only come 
through coercion. The most effective information through which the economy could be guided was 
provided by prices; the proper response to the growing complexity of a modern economy was to rely upon 
spontaneous forces rather than upon more planning and intervention. In Hayek’s view the market 
economy would produce economic progress along lines that could not be anticipated in advance but 
depended upon the collaborations and relationships developed out of the preferences of individuals.  
For Hayek, international trade was behind economic and political progress. His historical model was 
driven by what is now covered by ‘globalisation’, one which focused on the ability of people to form 
trading relationships over long distances with those of very different background and character. This was 
a source of political freedom because it happened outside close government control. 
The gradual transformation of a rigidly organised hierarchic system into one where men could at least 
attempt to shape their own life, where man gained the opportunity of knowing and choosing different 
forms of life, is closely associated with the growth of commerce. From the commercial cities of northern 
Italy the new view of life  spread with commerce to the west and the north, through France and the south-
west of Germany to the Low counties and the British Isles, taking firm root wherever there was no 
despotic political power to stifle it.iii
 For Hayek, the protection of freedom depended on the vigour of the private economy. It was not a 
promise of a life of security, or ease, or inevitable prosperity. Freedom was dependent on the dispersal of 
power that the free economy sustained. It therefore legitimated inequality. Everyone benefited from an 
unequal distribution of property-even those who had no likelihood of acquiring it-because private property 
limited the power of the state.  
 
Hayek did not have much interest in the idea of societies having a moral order or character.iv For 
Hayek, moral choices fell to individuals within the area of responsibility created by the free economy: ‘In 
our society there is neither occasion nor reason why people should develop common views about what 
should be done in such situations’ [where we have to make ethical choices].v
What we need is the restoration of right moral thinking-a return to proper moral values in our social 
philosophy. If you could only turn your crusade in that direction you would not feel quite so much like 
Don Quixote. I accuse you of perhaps confusing a little bit the moral and material issues. Dangerous acts 
can be done safely in a community which thinks and feels rightly, which would be the way to hell if they 
were executed by those who think and feel wrongly.
 He did not believe that a 
nation’s government might express a distinctive moral character. Because planning, in his view, 
necessitated brutal choices, it embraced the worst kind of people as its agents; the structure was all-
determining. By contrast, Keynes, the key economist of the 1930s, and one who advocated the 
development of a certain level and kind of economic planning, did have a sense that the state might 
embody a certain moral character of the nation.  He explained to Hayek, when challenging his hostility to 
planning, that Britain needed more planning not less: 
vi
This removed for him any anxieties about planning being exploited and pushed too far. This was a very 
different view of social organization to Hayek’s. Hayek believed in certain principles of social 
organization in which ‘feelings’ were largely irrelevant. The structure of the economy was what mattered. 
These principles were more powerful than national cultures. Keynes took the opposite view. Structures of 
power operated in a national setting and were decisively shaped by moral feelings. Such feelings were 
inevitably rooted in a national experience and set of traditions. 
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Hayek’s view was a dramatically different interpretation of the sources of freedom from what was 
current at the end of the second world war. This was a predominantly political vision firmly based on the 
nation state. The cornerstone was the impact of unemployment in the 1930s which taken to be the defining 
characteristic of the period. Such difficulties could not be battled against by individuals alone; they had to 
be countered by the mobilisation of a collective conscience.  This could most effectively be done through 
the state. Precisely because there was a focus on the idea of a collective conscience, the social democratic 
state required a fairly homogeneous population aware of its mutual obligations. There was also a 
confidence that governments would be able to moderate the fluctuations of the economy because 
depressions were now seen as ‘man made’. This was another version of freedom, because the state was 
protecting people from economic adversity that itself brought dependence on others. Hayek’s argument, 
by contrast, showed a great distrust of the interventionist state, which he believed would outweigh 
whatever beneficial characteristics there might be in a nation’s political culture.  
Even if Hayek’s vision was centred on the unpredictable and spontaneous interaction of individuals 
around economic activity of their own choosing, it was not a laissez faire model. Such activity required a 
firm framework to be set by the state, one of predictable general rules as opposed to discretionary 
intervention. Property had to be protected, taxes gathered, and a stable monetary system operated. The 
argument was not about diminishing the role of the state but  about  re-directing it to the protection of a 
competitive, free economy. 
Schumpeter’s argument was, at first sight, very different from Hayek’s. Whereas Hayek wrote about a 
threat to freedom from the socialist state, one which might in fact be avoided once people grasped its 
reality, Schumpeter presented an account in which the onset of socialism was inevitable. It was, in this 
sense, a more sociological account than Hayek’s. Indeed this is the difference each identified when 
reviewing the other’s work. For Hayek, Schumpeter saw history driven by social processes; for 
Schumpeter, Hayek saw ideas as the key, and floating above, and detached from, the social arrangements 
that had produced them. Whereas for Hayek people had been seduced by the appeal of welfare and 
security, for Schumpeter the process was driven by changes within capitalism. His argument in fact began 
with a lengthy treatment of the Marx’s analysis of the debilitating contradictions within the capitalist 
economy. Schumpeter was clearly impressed with Marx’s idea of process at work over the long term 
which  had a certain inevitability to it. Where Marx had gone wrong was in the focus on the economic 
weakness of capitalism as the cause of its downfall. There were indeed certain institutional reasons why 
the transition to socialism might be easier or smoother than conventionally assumed-principally the 
decline of the entrepreneur and his replacement by the large scale, bureaucratised enterprise which was 
perfectly compatible with economic innovation under either capitalism or socialism. But, essentially, 
capitalism was highly successful, and it was from this that its weakness sprang. What Schumpeter focused 
on was what he called the ‘civilisation’ of capitalism, that is the attitudes and values that went with the 
economic system. What he identified was a lack of commitment to that economic system. It was true that 
one great strength of capitalism was the democratic nature of consumption; it thrived on the creation and 
development of the mass market. But this was not enough. When Schumpeter examined the conventional 
supports of the system-property, political leadership, the family-he found them inadequate. They had been 
corroded by the core characteristic of capitalism, namely rational enquiry and the search for improvement. 
This had little time for the intuitive and inspirational qualities required of political leaders, which had 
been amply supplied in pre-capitalist feudal age. The change from physical property of the factory to the 
paper claim of the shareholder weakened the commitment to an enterprise, so nationalisation becomes an 
exercise in paper transfers. Shares ‘took the life out of the idea of property. It loosens the grip that was 
once so strong-the grip in the sense of the legal right and the actual ability to do as one pleases with one’s 
own; the grip also in the sense  that the holder of the title loses the will to fight, economically, physically, 
politically, for “his” factory and his control over it, to die if necessary on its steps.’vii It was interesting 
that the one kind of society where Schumpeter thought the transition to socialism would be resisted was 
one where small ‘real’ property had a powerful hold. And perhaps most revealingly of all, the family 
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ceased to provide that source of commitment over time to saving and innovation that it once had. 
Precisely because it became focused on the rational calculation of what benefits the married partners, what 
Schumpeter termed individualistic utilitarianism,  the willingness undertake  child-rearing began to look 
too demanding a distraction from the fulfilment of immediate interests. 
What happened to the family was one further element in the self-destructive nature of modern 
capitalism. As Schumpeter put it, ‘While the capitalist process, by virtue of the psychic attitudes it creates, 
progressively dims the values of family life and removes the conscientious inhibitions that an old moral 
tradition would have put in the way towards a different scheme of life, it at the same time implements the 
new tastes.’ viii
Hayek and Schumpeter therefore provided two powerful arguments about the threat which the growth 
of the social democratic state posed to the liberal economy. Hayek had advocated the restoration of earlier 
beliefs in the value of spontaneous economic forces as a response to the growing complexity and 
interrelatedness of economic life, and their central role in the preservation of freedom. This was in 
harmony with the notion of a global economy of relationships outside the state. Schumpeter offered a very 
different method of tackling the same problem, an analysis based on the destructive effects of the 
institutions of capitalist society upon that system. In so doing he had identified some of the ways in which 
a society might be undermined by a lack of commitment and weak sentiment. In other words, in an 
analysis of the changing fortunes of an economic system he had placed great emphasis upon attitudes and 
behaviours that sprang from morals and traditions which were not of the same essence as that system. 
 By this he meant the focus on immediate satisfactions and consumption and the 
displacement of the commitments and responsibilities of family life which had traditionally been one of 
the driving forces of the profit motive  
The social democratic state that Hayek and Schumpeter had both feared did become an established fact 
in Britain. It was committed to the welfare of its citizens, their economic security and their equality with 
one another. Over time this established itself as an orthodoxy; indeed the idea that the role of the state 
would continue to grow was taken to be incontrovertible. ix  By the 1970s, however, this vision of 
government was in serious trouble. The economy was suffering from what had once been considered an 
unlikely combination of inflation and unemployment. Both the Conservative and Labour governments 
struggled to contain the growth of spending on welfare that different interests demanded, failed to form 
effective relationships with the trade unions to limit workers’ pay, and became visibly helpless in trying to 
impose their authority on the nation. The vision of a social democratic state where, in return for welfare 
and economic benefits people would exercise collective responsibility for the society’s well-being, was 
shattered. One distinguished American political scientist entitled a book about this period as Britain 
Against Itself. x
Margaret Thatcher presented herself as the leader to rescue Britain from this disaster and to transform 
its state and society. She provided not only a set of policies but also a coherent identity: ‘Thatcherism’. 
This signalled a fundamental change in the approach to government and society. In place of social 
conscience came individual responsibility; instead of ever more state intervention came the withdrawal to 
a framework-setting role.  
 Britain became an example of how not to govern a country.  
How do we connect an actual political project-Margaret Thatcher’s attempt to change Britain in the 
1970s and 1980s-with these analyses produced in the last years of the second world war? The translation 
of ideas into the political sphere is rarely straightforward, and politicians  draw upon  them for 
instrumental purposes which may encourage a transient or imperfect connection. However, Schumpeter 
and Hayek have relevance because the Thatcher and her ministers often regarded the post -1945 period as 
where Britain took its wrong turning, which was precisely the focus of  both the books  under 
examination. xi
The elements of harmony between Thatcherism and Hayek’s writings are well established. Through 
their economic policies, the Thatcher governments stressed the virtues of setting a stable framework for 
economic activity rather than detailed intervention which had been characteristic of the earlier 1970s. 
They reduced the level of public ownership of industry through the privatisation programme. They 
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conveyed a greater regard for individual effort and the value of incentives. Their attitude towards 
European integration was to support the spread of single market for goods but to oppose the growth of 
‘Europe’ as a political institution. Indeed, this approach to economics and the defence of the market were 
often seen as the defining characteristics of Thatcherism.  
There was a political dimension to this support for the market. The interventionist state had generated 
relationships with key interest groups in the economy, principally business and the trade unions. Some 
commentators had even argued that these formed a fuller model for democratic government than that 
provided by the parliamentary system. The alternative, Hayekian view, was that such groups distorted the 
economy and burdened it with the claims for protection against others. The great strength of the market 
was its impersonality. Fortunes were not determined by the intervention of the bureaucracy, but were the 
outcome of many decisions taken in the market that were not specifically directed at particular groups. 
There were implications for welfare, too. The growth of the welfare state had been built up on the 
assumption  that there were certain needs that people had which needed to be met through the state, and 
that the state might legitimately determine what those were. The Thatcher governments were less happy 
about  the notion of needs, and more interested in the scope of possibilities that people had before them 
and which they had a responsibility to respond to: Norman Tebbit’s ‘on your bike’ as a advice to the 
unemployed, reporting his own father’s experience of the 1930s, was a particular example of this.xii
 Thatcherism was in part a reaction to the problems in Britain in the 1970s of which the weakness 
of the state was a core element. The state was perceived as being too interventionist and therefore, when it 
failed in its attempts to deal with the problems of inflation and unemployment through incomes policies 
and the social contract with the trade unions, too weak. The intention was to replace this role with one that 
was both more circumspect in what the state might be able to achieve, but also more forthright in asserting 
the state’s authority over the other interests in the polity. This was far from a ‘laissez-faire’ state.  
 
Hayek’s analysis was built on the importance of the market economy for the preservation of freedom. 
Thatcherism also placed great emphasis on the free economy, but there was more than that at the heart of 
the vision.xiii
To support the individual alone was not enough. The individual only understood a sense of obligation 
and moral conviction from his or her family; and that family was not merely formed by immediate parents 
but by those of earlier generations. The family was crucial for the transmission of values. Again, the 
parallel with Schumpeter’s interest in the family was striking. The values that Thatcher supported 
involved a sharp challenge to Britain’s immediate past which had been shaped by post-war social 
democracy. This challenge was also one that involved institutions that were powerfully linked with 
Britain’s history. The civil service, the medical profession, and education-especially the universities-were 
portrayed as sources of Britain’s decline because they had sapped the entrepreneurial spirit on which the 
economy depended. This assault on familiar institutions infuriated many of her own Conservative 
supporters. 
 Thatcher wanted Britain to be prosperous and respected in the world. Developments since 
1945 had prevented that, because they sapped individuals’ sense of responsibility and desire for self-
sufficiency and improvement. There had been too much emphasis on the state meeting the needs of the 
people rather than the people making their own choices and taking more responsibility for their own 
circumstances. Political debate in Britain in the 1970s had hardly focused at all on the individual until 
Thatcher began to make that the foundation of her political appeal. Individuals were expected to be 
responsible, self-sufficient and also entrepreneurial and adventurous. Schumpeter had seen the decline of 
the entrepreneur as one of the main reasons why capitalism had lost its spirit; Thatcher’s encouragement 
of the innovative businessman was in this same vein. 
An interesting dimension of this identity was that it had little connection with Britain’s imperial past. A 
major event in the Thatcher period was the Falklands War of 1982, when, as a result of a military 
expedition, the Falkland Islands were recaptured from Argentinian occupation. Its success restored public 
confidence in the government and in the nation after a particularly difficult period for the economy 
between 1979 and 1981. This was, strictly speaking, the re-assertion of influence over a colony-it was an 
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episode firmly within Britain’s imperial history. But this was not how the expedition was defended. It was 
justified as defending the islanders’ right to self-determination. Self-determination was, of course, an anti-
imperial sentiment: it was the right that undermined imperial power. So Thatcher’s assertion of the state’s 
military strength was as a power shorn of imperial pretension.  
 But even if Thatcher’s approach was to criticise and challenge institutions that seemed rooted in 
Britain’s identity, she still made her appeal on the basis of a connection with tradition and a powerful 
image of Britain’s past. As she expressed this in her famous speech about Britain’s relationship with 
Europe in Bruges in 1988, the European idea should recognise that its nations embodied ‘different 
traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one’s own country.’ xiv This where the 
views of Thatcher and her Conservative Party  also diverged from Hayek’s. It was not just a question of 
acknowledging the importance of national values and traditions, but of how politics worked. Hayek had 
laid down sets of principles about the rule of law and the free economy that ensured freedom and opposed 
planning of a certain kind. For Conservatives, politics was about response and adaptation to particular 
circumstances and problems. It was about the use of judgement and experience rather than the application 
of principles decided in advance; it was about the particular and the concrete rather than the 
universal. xvFor Britain she stressed the importance of re-asserting Victorian values-those characteristics 
that explained Britain’s pre-eminence as an industrial nation and a confident island power with influence 
across the world. These embraced a strong work ethic, self-reliance and property ownership, and 
responsibility for one’s actions.xvi
But there was a larger picture. Thatcher had argued for two things: first, a degree of incoherence in 
British society, and second the importance of tradition in identity. The incoherence came from the 
weakening of shared values, of common and therefore unspoken assumptions, about how people ought to 
live together. A consequence of this has been the weakening of the influence of the family in the 
transmission of values, and reliance upon state institutions to fill that role, especially through education. 
However, the institutions of welfare and education were seen as failing to exercise any countervailing 
influence, because of a reluctance to stress individual responsibility, and also the impossibility of the task. 
Different causes have been assigned to this loss of moral order. Some have argued that secularisation in 
eroding a common religious experience has removed a source of shared values and a clear guide to moral 
behaviour. Others have placed  a stronger emphasis on the growth of rationalism as a corrosive of 
traditional behaviour and institutions, which removes a  source of identity and shared assumptions. This 
rational approach to behaviour and institutions therefore turns against the progress for which it has been 
responsible. There are therefore two conceptions of the individual at work here. One was of the individual 
as self-contained, able and free to determine his or her future unhindered by the past, and self-sufficient in 
their own moral standards. This individual was situated within a state that was devoted to fulfilling the 
needs of its citizens, and acknowledged the plurality of views and interests within the society. The other 
was of the  individual aware of traditions and inherited values in the formation of their identities, 
transmitted by the family, and committed to self-sufficiency not because of a free-standing capability but 
as a means of fulfilling obligations to others. 
 They were opposed to the notion of the ‘social’ or ‘society’ as an entity 
in itself, and distrusted social explanations for individual behaviour.  
Both Hayek’s and Schumpeter’s analyses  perceptively anticipated some of Britain’s problems which 
had proved to be so crippling by the 1970s, and not surprisingly we can find elements of both in 
Thatcher’s agenda for Britain’s recovery. Hayek’s view about the dangers posed by the interventionist 
state, and the unhealthy politics which resulted, are paralleled in Thatcher’s belief the role of the state for 
creating a framework for free economic activity rather than being the instrument of intervention. In the 
analysis of Thatcherism, it is the association with Hayek that has been placed at the forefront of the 
connection between practical politics and contemporary ideas. But it is the parallels with Schumpeter, 
unacknowledged by the politicians, which are perhaps equally striking. Schumpeter’s interest lay in the 
importance of the values that  buttress and sustain an economic system and, crucially, the fact that the 
source of these values may lie outside that system and may even be undermined by it.  
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The key argument, then, is that at the heart of Thatcherism, the force that challenged social democracy 
and ushered in a market economy, lay two dimensions of the state. One, in challenging the interventionist 
state’s efforts to override the market in the pursuit of social justice, full employment, and redistributive 
welfare, was at one with broader world rejection of socialism. It produced an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of  
flexible capitalism around what was often mistakenly referred to as the ‘laissez-faire’ state, but this did 
link Britain with the forces of globalisation and give a significance to Thatcher on the world stage. In 
short, the British system in supporting globalisation, was linked with universal trends that greeted the end 
of socialism. This universal element was consistent with Hayek, who had set out principles for economic 
organisation that specified what role the state should have to preserve markets in conditions of economic 
complexity. Hayek himself firmly believed that national cultures were powerless against trends in ideas. 
That was why the socialist threat had been so dangerous. That was why he differed with fellow economist 
John Maynard Keynes who believed that the British could give more power to the state than other 
countries because they could trust the moral standards of those who would run it.  
Alongside such principles of an apparently universal kind, there was second dimension to the state in 
the period of Thatcher’s premiership that drew on specific values that were rooted in Britain’s traditions 
and history. These had echoes of Schumpeter’s argument that what mattered in keeping capitalism going 
was not rational calculation of personal advantage but emotional commitment that came from non-
calculative attachment to the family, and to property in particular. It was these elements which, precisely 
because they were rooted in a national past, made Thatcherism ‘non-exportable’.xvii
So far the presentation of the British experience has been focused on the kind of politics that rejected 
socialism and social democracy. This victory has been presented as decisive and irreversible. Did 
Thatcher complete a process of transformation, or have major changes occurred since her departure from 
office in 1990? In other words, has the Thatcher version of the state itself been displaced by a different 
form of the state in the modern period?  This is the key question, that the Thatcher state  was  at the end of 
a process of intense state identity with national values, and has been displaced with one where the attempt 
to weld a national consciousness is much weaker. Certainly, Philip Bobbitt, who has pioneered the 
argument about the emergence of the market state, believes Thatcher was at the end of a process rather 
than at the beginning. Bobbitt’s argument is that the terrorist threat that confronts the West has taken its 
particular form and structure- a loose collection of groups attacking values that cross national boundaries- 
precisely because of changes in the nature of the state under the impact of globalisation.  Because of the 
strength of globalisation-those influences driven by economic development that operate outside the state-
the role of the state has changed, and become less intensely related to national identity.xviii
 Even though Thatcher 
was therefore powerfully associated with the defeat of socialism and the triumph of the market in a way 
that seemed to cross national boundaries, that was only part of the story and not the most important one. 
The argument therefore becomes that the state under Thatcher, the version that displaced the socialist one, 
was not only far from being  ‘laissez-faire’,  but was also the embodiment of a specific national identity 
because it drew upon sources which, while they were indispensable for a market economy, were not 
rooted solely in capitalism alone. The state was therefore a powerful embodiment of a particular national 
identity as much as the instrument for the application of more universal values associated with the market 
economy. 
 It has become, 
of necessity, less committed to preserving patterns of employment or a particular economic life, or 
redistributing the outcomes of the market, and more about giving them the means and the opportunity to 
take advantage of what the global economy can offer. This is intensified because of the significance of 
consumption in modern life, which exerts universal pressures on people’s understanding of the life styles 
they should aspire to. Although people still spend the majority of their time working, it is as consumers 
that that their social and political relationships are conceptualised. xix Governments provide choices rather 
than authoritative decisions about what people should receive and how they should be treated. Many 
activities that were in the hands of the state have become privatised. There is now simply, a looser 
relationship between state and people, and the notion of a common identity weaker. Thatcher’s Britain 
146   Richard Whiting /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  77 ( 2013 )  138 – 148 
looks increasingly like a last throw of the dice for a certain kind of political system in which the state 
represented a very particular set of national values.. 
It has been argued that Thatcher believed that the market society that at one level was consistent with 
globalisation also had to be shaped by emphases upon individual character that were specific to British 
history and traditions. What has happened to that element with the growth of the market state? Can the 
market state, in other words, provide an answer to questions about the constituents of a nation’s moral 
order, that is also consistent with the universal level at which the global economy operates? One answer 
has been that the values that drive these states are no longer particular but universal: that there is 
agreement about the primacy of democratic parliamentary systems combined with individual rights.xx
The significance of this view can be appreciated from the contrast between Britain’s imperial 
administration of the 19
 To 
put it simply, ‘We are all the same.’ This suggests that for some there is a congruence between the global 
economy and a global moral order, based on the weakening of national identity.  
th century and western strategy in modern Iraq or Afghanistan. The imperialism of 
the Victorian period embodied a view that certain moral standards were absolute, but it was tempered a by 
a very clear sense of the differences between the metropolitan and colonial peoples. Colonial careers were 
characterised by lengthy and sustained commitment to understanding profoundly different peoples. In the 
recent period, there has been a very different perspective, namely that peoples across nations have certain 
common requirements in terms of the structure of government, the rule of law and attention to rights of 
individuals.  One of the participants in western intervention has commented that most of the policy 
makers trying to bring improvement to Iraq or Afghanistan ‘came from post-modern, secular, globalised 
states with liberal traditions in law and government.’ As a result, ‘The implicit denial of the difference 
between cultures is the new mass brand of intervention.’xxi
Within Britain, the anxieties about a lack of social order and moral confusion that Thatcher tried to 
address are still present and unresolved. The debates about their causes continue. Some believe the 
disorder is rooted in the weakening of those widely held, but often unstated, assumptions about what is 
proper behaviour and what people’s obligations to one another should be. These provide the coherence for 
a society and, in Britain’s case, their disappearance has been linked with the weakening of religious faith 
and practice which had its beginnings in the 19
 This intervention was far more detached from, 
and ignorant of, the societies to which it was directed than historic forms of colonial administration. 
th
The other modern event with which globalisation is inextricably linked is the banking crisis which 
began in 2008.. Do the solutions that are being searched for strengthen the idea of a global order or do 
they link up with some of these concerns about what is going on within states? Banking is the core of the 
international global economy, operating through closely linked markets and based in cities which are 
often as much ‘international’ as rooted in their domestic societies. Bankers, too, are argued to be 
particularly tax-sensitive, likely to uproot themselves and move on to easier locations if tax burdens in one 
country move unfavourably compared to those elsewhere. When this detachment went hand-in-hand with 
economic success it seemed to be merely a feature of the international economy rather than a problem. 
The economic crisis has for the most part reinforced the way states have to follow  the international 
economy, with much of the effort focusing on the need for global, or supra -national solutions. These 
focus on the crucial elements, such as the level of capital reserves banks must hold, which are amenable to 
international regulation. But for many people another disturbing feature of the banking crisis-the 
relationship between earnings, incentives and performance-has distinctly national rather than universal 
significance. The conventional wisdom has been that people are more troubled by inequalities with those 
 century. For others, the sense of disorder comes from the 
very affluence and consumption that have been regarded as the triumphs of the global economy, but 
which have brought impatience and dissatisfaction rather than ease and equanimity. These issues suggest 
that the market state has failed to provide a satisfactory environment for its population, or even the means 
to address these problems. The nation state, therefore, still has a significant role within the global 
economy. The question is whether what goes on in the international economy also penetrates into the 
heart of the nation state and its concerns. 
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close to them in economic fortune than by the much higher earnings of those higher up the scale. However, 
the banking crisis focused criticism on these earnings because of the connection with disastrous 
mismanagement. Very high rewards and ‘bonuses’ caused outrage because they seemed to have 
encouraged reckless and damaging decisions. Rewards which had been presented or justified as the result 
of the market now appeared to be perversely detached from any such ‘efficiency’ criteria, and merely an 
indication of greed and lack of restraint. 
It has long been argued that relationships in markets have not been simply shaped by pay for services, 
but also reflect conventions about what is proper behaviour. That is, in the economy as elsewhere, the 
importance of developing a good reputation and being well-regarded has been described as the  prime 
motivation its actors. 
xxiii
xxii This should, in theory be a source of strength for the market, because it ensures 
acceptable behaviour. Whatever may be written down in a contract is embedded in a set of moral values 
or conventions that ensure that behaviour remains within acceptable bounds.  The economic crisis 
shattered any confidence that this might be effective in the City of London. Criticism of bankers therefore 
focused not only on the decisions they had taken and the kinds of financial instruments that they had 
devised, but also on their astronomic levels of reward and the connection between the two. Incentives 
when pushed to these levels had destroyed restraint. So bankers were not just criticised for failings of 
technical financial judgement, but for their behaviour seen in a more moral context. This explains a rather 
curious aspect of the unfolding of the banking crisis in Britain. During the debates about possible reforms 
to the structure of banking some of its key actors appeared before the Parliamentary select committee, and 
offered widely anticipated apologies. One by one, each member of the group  said they were sorry for 
what they had done. Lord Stevenson of Calderton started by saying, with due and deliberate solemnity, 
‘we are sorry at the effect this has had on the communities we serve’ and the others followed. xxiv
The main theme of this paper has been the way in which the political movement which ushered in a 
liberal market society in Britain, namely Thatcherism, did so through a state which was not wholly 
consistent with that kind of economy. That is, while some of the policies of the Thatcher governments 
were explicable in terms of a Hayekian view of the role of the state, there were key elements that could 
not be explained in those terms. These can be summarised by looking at the concept of the individual, and 
at the understanding of politics. The individual in the market economy, and in the global society, is seen 
as pursing the fulfilment of their desires and the meeting of their needs as they define them, and to the 
best of their ability, not heavily bound by respect for the past, a sense of duty, or restraint. What they did 
have was the support of a common agreement about the importance of rights for individuals that stood 
against the restraints of tradition. The individual in Thatcher’s Britain was meant to have some of these 
enterprising attributes, but was also to be shaped by an ethical code rooted in tradition. With regard to the 
understanding of politics, similar contrasts apply. The politics of the market economy are based on certain 
principles which are held to be universally valid and can act as a guide to political action. The alternative 
was to see politics as a practical activity addressing particular problems within a specific context, as 
Thatcherism was. It has been the argument of this paper that on the conceptions of these two elements rest 
very different roles for the nation state in a global economy. The impact of international economic crisis 
and security challenges, and the sharply different responses that have emerged to them, suggest that the 
influence of the nation state, and the importance of its own histories and traditions, has yet to be 
determined. 
 This 
was the kind of response, and delivered in the manner, of close face to face relationships. It responded to 
the demand for an admission that public expectations of ‘normal’ behaviour had been shattered, rather 
than simply technical mistakes made in banking operations. As governments search for an appropriate 
structure for international banking activity, the question remains whether the restraint of bankers’ rewards 
will be part of that agenda, delivered through a code of ethics about what makes a reasonable reward for a 
banker that a number of nations can support, or will it be one explored in purely national contexts. If 
bankers’ pay remains a serious question (which it may not), and if it is ‘solved’ through international 
agreements, this will point to a further weakening of national identity. 
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